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Methods of Compensating Victims of War:
Combating the Problems of an Enduring System
On the wall in chalk is written
"They want war"




War may simply be defined as "an act of violence intended to com-
pel our opponent to fulfill our will."' Throughout history, the
human race has repeatedly engaged in armed combat to produce this
result. In the process, however, lives and property have been de-
stroyed with immeasurable magnitude.
The gas chambers and sadistic medical experiments of the Nazi re-
gime succeeded in torturing millions during World War II. Recently,
several countries have taken steps to compensate these individuals:
West Germany paid $438 billion to Israel in 1988;2 East Germany
agreed to pay $100 million to surviving Jewish victims of the Holo-
caust;3 and Austria paid $6.5 million in similar reparations. 4 Several
German corporations also have paid nearly $12 million to those
forced to labor in their factories during the Nazi war effort.5 In an-
other part of the world, South Korean diplomats are requesting $2.3
billion from Japan for Korean survivors of the U.S. atomic bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 6
In the United States, more than 500,000 battle deaths were re-
corded from the American Revolution through the Vietnam con-
1. 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 543 (15th ed. 1977) (in the words of Prussian
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who "cogently defines war as a national instru-
ment of foreign policy").
2. Reuter Libr. Rep., June 6, 1988 (AM cycle).
3. Id
4. L.A. Times, Mar. 24, 1988, § 1, at 2, col. 1.
5. Id., June 12, 1988, § 1, at 9, col. 4.
6. Id, Aug. 15, 1989, § 1, at 2, col. 1.
flict.7 These wars cost the United States over $1.3 billion, with much
of this cost allocated to compensating the victims. 8 Even today, the
Vietnam saga continues as 34,000 veterans exposed to the defoliant
Agent Orange9 receive a $240 million settlement from the U.S.
government.' 0
Presently, the Bush Administration is working on a plan to com-
pensate the families of the 290 victims killed when an American na-
val vessel, the U.S.S. Vincennes, destroyed an Iranian airliner over
7. War Casualties
American Revolution (1775-1783) * 4,000
War of 1812 (1812-1814) * 2,000
Mexican War (1846-1848) * 13,000
Civil War (1861-1865)(Union forces only) 140,414
Indian Wars (Approx. 1860-1898) * 1,000
Spanish-American War (1898-1902) 385
World War I (1917-1918) 53,402
World War I (1940-1947) 291,557
Korean Conflict (1950-1955) 33,629
Vietnam (1957-1976) 47,378
586,765
• Reflects an approximation of the total deaths in service, in-
cluding both combat and non-combat related deaths resulting
from accidents or disease.
38 U.S.C.A. § 1, XXXI - XXXIII (West 1979) (table no. 2); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970, at 1140, Series Y 856-903 (Bicentennial ed. 1975); U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1989, at 336 (109th ed. 1989)
(table no. 48).




















BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 1140, Series Y 856-903 (Bicentennial ed.
1975); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1989, at 336 (109th ed. 1989)(table no. 48).
9. Agent Orange, a herbicide, was sprayed on the jungles of Vietnam to uncover
the Vietcong as they prepared to ambush American and South Vietnamese troops. J.
HENDERSON & A. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 206 (1987).
Vietnam veterans brought a class action against the Agent Orange manufacturers,
claiming that it contained trace amounts of dioxin which caused cancer, birth defects,
and neurological disorders. Id; see also In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litiga-
tion, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
10. L.A. Times, July 6, 1988, § 1, at 2, col. 3.
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the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war."1 The Administration also
sought $29.6 million from Iraq for the May 17, 1987 attack on a frig-
ate, the U.S.S. Stark, which killed 37 Americans.i 2
In each of these examples, victims of war are, or likely will be, re-
ceiving remuneration. The purpose of this comment is to discuss the
various means by which such victims are compensated, and to ana-
lyze the problems which frequently arise therein.13 Section II de-
ll. N.Y. Times, March 22, 1989, § A, at 10, col. 3. On June 3, 1988, the United
States cruiser Vincennes fired two missiles at Iran Air Flight 655. Reuter Libr. Rep.,
August 15, 1989 (AM cycle). The Vincennes was cruising the Persian Gulf at the time
in an effort to maintain neutral shipping during the Iran-Iraq war. Id. All 290 passen-
gers and 15 crew members on board the aircraft died. Id. Iran brought suit at the
United Nations International Court of Justice [hereinafter ICJ] against the United
States claiming that it had violated international air traffic regulations. Id. Iran re-
quested that the ICJ censure the United States and determine the amount of damages
it must pay for the loss of the plane, and its passengers and crew. Id. The United
States argued that it had not committed a violation of international law, but instead,
acted in self-defense after repeatedly warning the plane's crew. Id.
The United States nevertheless offered to pay $250,000 to the families of wage-earn-
ing victims, and $100,000 to all other victims. Nat'l L.J., Sept. 4, 1989, at 3, col. 1. This
formula could vary depending on the number of dependents the victim has, and the
dependent's relationship to the victim. Wash. Post, July 18, 1989, § 1, at 14. However,
no compensation will be paid to the Iranian government, or for the loss of the plane.
Nat'l L.J., Sept. 4, 1989, at 3, col. 1. The United States State Department idded that
this compensation process will take considerable time due to the extensive negotia-
tions between the United States, foreign ministries, and lawyers for the victims' fami-
lies. Id The United States also has insisted on the appointment of an acceptable
mediator, such as another government, a charitable organization or an insurance com-
pany, to distribute the money, rather than giving it to the Iranian government for dis-
tribution. Chicago Tribune, July 18, 1989, at 10.
In addition to the ICJ case, over 200 relatives of the victims have filed suit in Cali-
fornia state and federal courts. Id, July 15, 1989, at 3. The plaintiffs allege a products
liability claim against the defense contractors for the defective design of the Aegis
Weapons System Radar used in destroying the plane. Nat'l L.J., Sept. 4, 1989, at 3, col.
1. The plaintiffs also seek damages from the United States government under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act. Id. The latter claim, however, appears to be invalid because the
government may elect not to be sued under the Act. Id
12. N.Y. Times, March 22, 1989, § A, at 10, col. 3. The families of the 37 United
States sailors were each paid $737,000 by Iraq. Propriety to the United Press Int'l, July
18, 1989, BC cycle. The United States government has been criticized for the sizeable
difference between the Vincennes and Stark compensation figures. Id The United
States maintains that the Vincennes acted in self-defense in mistakenly destroying the
Iranian airplane during an attack by Iranian gunboats. Id. The Iraqi pilot who fired
upon the Stark, however, was not acting in self-defense according to the United States,
and had twice been warned that he was nearing a United States warship. Id.
13. This comment is limited to compensatory methods applicable to war victims.
For a discussion regarding the laws of war, see generally 2 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1961); M. MCDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961);
Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 764 (1981); Van Dyke, The
Riddle of Establishing Clear and Workable Rules to Govern Armed Conflicts, 3
fines who is a victim of war. Section III examines the statutory
remedies available in the United States and Section IV addresses the
use of legal actions in United States courts for obtaining redress. Fi-
nally, Section V discusses the various international methods of remu-
neration and protection of victims of war.
II. DEFINING THE "VICTIM OF WAR"
Defining the victim of war is a necessary precursor to disbursing
payment. Determining who will and who will not be compensated,
and how much compensation will be paid, involves an examination of
several criteria.
The initial query is: What is the status of the purported victim?
The individual may have suffered death, physical or mental injury,
captivity, internment, or damage or seizure of property. Each class
defines a separate victim of war and the rate of compensation.
If the victim died "as the result of injury or disease incurred in or
aggravated by active military, naval, or air service, in line of duty,
during a period of war,"1 4 only the "surviving spouse, child or chil-
dren, and dependent parent or parents"' 5 of the victim are entitled to
compensation.i6 The rate of death compensation paid to the survi-
vor(s) depends upon their relationship to the decedent.' 7 Survivors
may also receive a pension depending upon their age, and the particu-
lar war in which the decedent served.' 8
If the victim became disabled, the rate of compensation depends
upon the nature' 9 and extent20 of the disability. A pension for non-
service related disability also is available,2' provided the individual
U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 34 (1984). For a discussion regarding compensation of terror-
ist victims, see generally Hostage Relief Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. § 5561 (1982); Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 4 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1865 (1986); Note, Compensating Victims of Terrorism: The
Current Framework in the United States, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 383 (1987). For an over-
view regarding other impacts of war on the economy, see generally 78 AM. JUR. 2D
War §§ 74-146 (1975); 93 C.J.S. War and National Defense §§ 7, 17, 50, 68-201 (1956).
14. 38 U.S.C.A. § 321 (West 1979).
15. Id.
16. Id.; see infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
17. 38 U.S.C.A. § 322 (West 1979); see infra note 40 and accompanying text. The
rate of death compensation for veterans who died before January 1, 1957, during peace-
time service is the same as for wartime service. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 341-342 (West 1979).
18. See generally 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 531-543 (West 1979) (compensation rates paid to
survivors of American veterans who served in the Civil War, the Indian War, the
Spanish-American War, the Mexican Border Conflict, World War I, World War II, the
Korean Conflict, and the Vietnam era).
19. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 301, 310, 312-313 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989); see infra notes 41-47
and accompanying text.
20. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 311, 312, 314 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989); see infra notes 41-47 and
accompanying text. The rate of disability compensation for peacetime service is the
same as for wartime service. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 334-335 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
21. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-562 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989). See generally In re McCor-
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has not been imprisoned for a felony or misdemeanor.22 However, an
individual will not be deemed a victim of war and entitled to disabil-
ity compensation "if the disability is the result of the veteran's own
willful misconduct." 23
Captured or missing military personnel are also considered victims
of war. The Missing Persons Act 2 4 provides for the continuation of
pay and allowances to such individuals,25 unless they negligently con-
tributed to their own capture.2 6 Internees may likewise be war vic-
tims, with compensation commensurate to the individual's age,
disability, if any, and contributions by a collateral source.2 7
The class of war victims also includes those who have had their
property seized or destroyed.28 Compensation, however, depends
upon where the property is located,29 and whether or not the pur-
ported victim is a resident alien enemy of the United States.3 0 If
American citizens or allies have their property seized, damaged, or
destroyed abroad, the United States may provide compensation.3 1
Moreover, remuneration may be paid for a citizen's property taken
within the territorial boundaries of the United States, if it is used to
further the war effort.32 No compensation need be paid, however, for
enemy property seized, damaged or destroyed within the United
States.33
mick's Estate, 169 Misc. 672, 8 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1938); 11 FED. PRAcT. MANUAL Acts of
Discrimination "During" Employment § 16897B (West Supp. 1989).
22. 38 U.S.C.A. § 505 (West 1979).
23. Id. § 310. Thus, if the individual intentionally shot himself in the leg, for ex-
ample, he would not be entitled to disability compensation under this statute.
24. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 1001-1012 (West 1951 & Supp. 1989) (current version at 37
U.S.C.A. §§ 551-560 (West 1988)).
25. 37 U.S.C.A. §§ 552-553 (West 1988); 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2005 (West 1951); 6
C.J.S. Armed Services § 111 (1975 & Supp. 1989); see infra notes 102-06 and accompa-
nying text.
26. 6 C.J.S. Armed Services § 111 (1975 & Supp. 1989).
27. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2004 (West 1951); see infra notes 121-48 and accompanying
text. See generally 78 AM. JUR. 2D War § 38 (1975) (congressional prerogative to de-
tain or intern those United States citizens who, due to their hostile origin or associa-
tion, pose a threat to public safety or national security).
28. See Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 1-44 (1917).
29. Id. § 7.
30. See Stadtmuller v. Miller, 11 F.2d 732, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1926) (determination
based upon the individual's residence or commercial domicile, not nationality); see also
Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U.S. 457, 472-73 (1925); 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and
Citizens §§ 2023, 2026 (1986).
31. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 32(a) (1968).
32. Id. § 9. See generally Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494 (1941); Becker
Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U.S. 74 (1935); Henkels v. Sutherland, 271 U.S. 298 (1926).
33. See Diaz v. United States, 222 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1912); see also Silesian-Ameri-
The victims of war discussed thus far have been clearly delineated
by a number of criteria. Determining who and how much to compen-
sate depends upon (1) the status of the victim; (2) whether death or
disability occurred during service; (3) whether the injury stemmed
from willful misconduct or contributory negligence; (4) the nature
and extent of the disability; (5) the relationship to the decedent or
injured party; (6) when the victim served; or, if property is involved,
(7) where that property is located, and (8) what the victim's relation-
ship is to the United States.3 4
There are other victims of war, however, who are not as clearly de-
fined. The sorrow of war often extends beyond the battlefield to
reach those individuals close to the victim. Family, friends, associ-
ates, and the community are all notably affected by the loss or disa-
bility of a loved one.3 5 As one writer describes it: "In most families,
the man was [a husband, companion, father, handy man, and protec-
tor] ,. .. and these folks... missed him hourly and longed for his re-
turn."36 While federal law authorizes compensation for individuals
closely related to the victim, many of these indirect victims of war
have suffered injuries that are not compensable.37
can Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469, 475-77 (1947) (policy of preparing for war dictates
whether the United States government should exercise its right to confiscate property
of alien enemies). See generally Herrerra v. United States, 222 U.S. 558 (1911); J. Ribas
y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315 (1904).
34. See supra notes 14-33 and accompanying text.
35. R. HILL, FAMILIES UNDER STRESS: ADJUSTMENT TO THE CRISIS OF WAR SEPA.
RATION AND REUNION 57 (1949).
36. Id.
37. Cf. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY RESTITU.
TION § 8.1, at 544 (1973). Individuals who suffer personal injury may, in certain circum-
stances, recover reasonable compensatory damages for pain, suffering, and mental
anguish. Id. at 544-45. Family members and other indirect victims of war may also ex-
perience pain, suffering and mental anguish resulting from the death or disability of a
loved one during military service. However, these indirect claimants may not recover
damages for acts committed against their loved ones unless the defendant knew with a
high degree of probability that the plaintiff would suffer extreme emotional distress
following a violent attack, yet proceeded with intentional disregard of this probability.
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 12, at 65-66 (5th ed. 1984). Where the defendant is a belligerent or the United
States government, recovery appears unlikely under this theory. In the former case,
the belligerent rarely confronts the direct victim, much less the indirect victim. In the
latter case, the United States government is generally immune from liability for inten-
tional tort or negligence claims. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 1976 & Supp. 1989); Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-2680 (West 1965 & Supp. 1989); see also
United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985); Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States,
431 U.S. 666 (1977); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). See generally Com-
ment, Intramilitary Tort Immunity: A Constitutional Justification, 15 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 623 (1988).
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III. STATUTORY REMEDIES
A. The Veterans' Benefits Act
1. Death and Disability Benefits
The Veterans' Benefits Act (VBA) expressly entitles a veteran's
"surviving spouse, child or children, and dependent parent or par-
ents"38 to compensation if the veteran died in military service prior
to January 1, 1957.39 Monthly rates of death compensation are speci-
fied under this statute.40
In the case of disability, the VBA entitles a veteran to a specified
rate of monthly compensation if willful misconduct is not involved.41
The rate of compensation increases in proportion to the extent of dis-
ability.42 For example, if the veteran is thirty percent disabled, the
38. 38 U.S.C.A. § 321 (West 1979).
39. Id
40. Id § 322(a). Section 322(a) provides that:
(a) The monthly rates of death compensation shall be as follows:
(1) Surviving spouse but no child, $87;
(2) Surviving spouse with one child, $121, (with $29 for each additional
child);
(3) No surviving spouse but one child, $67;
(4) No surviving spouse but two children, $94 (equally divided);
(5) No surviving spouse but three children, $122 (equally divided)(with $23
for each additional child, total amount to be equally divided);
(6) Dependent parent, $75;
(7) Both dependent parents, $40 each.
Id Additional compensation is permitted if the payee is in a nursing home, or is help-
less, blind, or in need of assistance. Id § 322(b).
41. Id. § 310.
42. Id. § 314 (West Supp. 1989). Section 314 provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of section 310 of this title-
(a) if and while the disability is rated 10 percent the monthly compensation
shall be $73;
(b) if and while the disability is rated 20 percent the monthly compensation
shall be $138;
(c) if and while the disability is rated 30 percent the monthly compensation
shall be $210;
(d) if and while the disability is rated 40 percent the monthly compensation
shall be $300;
(e) if and while the disability is rated 50 percent the monthly compensation
shall be $426;
(f) if and while the disability is rated 60 percent the monthly compensation
shall be $537;
(g) if and while the disability is rated 70 percent the monthly compensation
shall be $678;
(h) if and while the disability is rated 80 percent the monthly compensation
shall be $784;
(i) if and while the disability is rated 90 percent the monthly compensation
shall be $883;
veteran would be entitled to $210 in monthly compensation;43 eighty
percent disability would result in monthly payments of $784, 44 with
$1,468 paid for total disability.45 In addition, the loss of certain body
parts will result in supplemental benefits.46 Further remuneration
also is provided for dependents if the veteran is more than thirty per-
cent disabled.47
2. Statutory Military Insurance
The VBA is important not only because of its provisions regarding
death and disability benefits, but also because it creates three insur-
ance plans for all military personnel. 48 The purpose of statutory mil-
itary insurance is to protect war victims and their families from
financial hardship,49 and to provide insurance to military personnel
at a reasonable rate.50 The policies are construed liberally in favor of
the insured to provide the maximum amount of protection available
under the statute.51 Moreover, anyone who passes the mental and
physical exam for war service is conclusively presumed to be insura-
ble.52 Congress also has provided for automatic insurance protection
(j) if and while the disability is rated as total the monthly compensation shall
be $1,468.
Id.
43. Id. § 314(c).
44. Id. § 314(h).
45. Id § 314(j).
46. Id. § 314(k)-(s). These subsections provide for supplemental compensation
ranging from $63 to $2,559 per month for the anatomical loss or loss of the use of one
or more creative organs, feet, hands, buttocks, eyes, ears, arms, legs, or an inability to
communicate by speech, or an absence of air and bone conduction. Id.
47. Id. § 315. Section 315 provides in pertinent part:
(1) If and while rated totally disabled and [the veteran]-
(A) has a spouse but no child, $88;
(B) has a spouse and one or more children, $148 plus $46 for each child in ex-
cess of one;
(C) has no spouse but one or more children, $61 plus $46 for each child in ex-
cess of one;
(D) has a parent dependent upon such veteran for support, then, in addition
to the above amounts, $71 for each parent so dependent.
Id. Section 315(1)(E) provides $161 per month in compensation if the veteran's spouse
is in a nursing home, or is helpless and blind, and section 315(1)(F) provides $136 per
month if the veteran has a child over eighteen years of age who is still in school. Id.
§ 315 (1)(E)-(F).
48. Id. §§ 701-708 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
49. See United States v. Williams, 302 U.S. 46, 50, rehg denied, 302 U.S. 779 (1937);
United States v. Kaminsky, 64 F.2d 735, 736 (5th Cir. 1933).
50. See Kontovich v. United States, 99 F.2d 661, 664 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 651 (1939).
51. See Howard v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 985, 987 (N.D. Wash. 1939). See also
Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (federal law providing that military personnel
may name whomever they wish as a beneficiary under the policy preempts community
property law which characterizes proceeds from a policy earned during the marriage as
community property).
52. See United States v. Patryas, 303 U.S. 341, 343 (1938) (Congress intended that
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in the statutory insurance plans which becomes effective when the
victim dies or becomes totally and permanently disabled during ac-
tive military duty.53
The first insurance plan is the National Service Life Insurance.5 4
It furnishes between $1,000 and $10,000 in insurance coverage55 and
offers a variety of payment plans.56 The premium rate is based upon
mortality tables and an annual interest rate of only three percent.57
The United States Government Life Insurance is the second plan.58
It also provides between $1,000 and $10,000 of insurance coverage,59
but it has a number of conversion options 60 and a premium rate
based upon an annual interest rate of three-and-a-half percent.61 The
third plan is the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance.6 2 This plan au-
thorizes its administrator "to purchase from one or more life insur-
ance companies a policy or policies of group life insurance to provide
the benefits" 63 to military personnel. It also automatically provides
up to $50,000 of insurance protection against death, unless the in-
sured elects not to be so insured, or specifies some lesser amount,
divisible by $10,000, in writing.64 All of these plans include an auto-
matic insurance protection clause.6 5
While these statutory insurance plans may appear attractive to mil-
itary personnel, each contains serious drawbacks. Not only does the
United States government act in its sovereign capacity when provid-
ing military insurance,6 6 but both the government's liability under
the policy and the claimant's right to sue are strictly statutory.67
statutory insurance policies be issued without regard to the applicant's health follow-
ing mental and physical examination for service).
53. See United States v. Preece, 85 F.2d 952, 953 (10th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300
U.S. 660, reh'g denied, 300 U.S. 687 (1937).
54. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-724 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
55. Id. § 703.
56. Id. §§ 704, 706, 708. Such plans include "[f]ive-year level premium term, ordi-
nary life, twenty-payment life, thirty-payment life, twenty-year endowment, endow-
ment at age sixty, and endowment at age sixty-five." Id. § 704(a).
57. Id. § 702.
58. Id. §§ 740-760.
59. Id § 741.
60. Id. § 742.
61. Id. § 743.
62. Id. §§ 765-779.
63. Id. § 766.
64. Id. § 767.
65. Id.
66. See United States v. Lewis, 202 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1953).
67. See Brown v. United States, 65 F.2d 65, 67 (9th Cir. 1933); Spaulding v. United
States, 261 F. Supp. 232, 236 (W.D. Okla. 1966).
Thus, although the United States is contractually obligated under the
policy, neither the insured nor the beneficiaries have a cause of ac-
tion against the government without its consent.68 In practical terms,
this may leave an aggrieved claimant not only without the insurance
proceeds upon which he or she may be dependent, but also without
an adversary and forum in which to litigate the claim. This, com-
bined with the extremely low interest rates, significantly reduces the
appeal of these policies.
3. Miscellaneous Provisions
Finally, the VBA provides several miscellaneous methods of com-
pensating American war victims and their families. These include
providing hospitals, nursing homes, domiciliaries, and medical care,6 9
burial benefits,70 and special loans. 71 The VBA also assists the victim
in readjusting to civilian life by furnishing special housing, vehicles,
and equipment for disabled veterans, 72 vocational rehabilitation, 73 ed-
ucational assistance, 74 and job counseling, training, and placement
services.75 These benefits provide invaluable assistance to the dis-
abled in learning to cope with their handicap.
B. The Trading With the Enemy Act
Under general principles of international law, a belligerent nation
has the right to seize and confiscate enemy property within its juris-
diction.76 Each sovereign power generally decides for itself, or by
treaty, whether compensation will be paid in this situation, or in the
case of seized or destroyed property outside its jurisdiction. The
Trading With the Enemy Act77 (TWEA) defines the United States
government's position concerning these matters. Regarding enemy
property used, seized, damaged, or destroyed by the federal govern-
ment within United States territory, Congress is under no constitu-
68. See Chavez v. United States, 74 F.2d 508, 509 (10th Cir. 1934); McLaughlin v.
United States, 74 F.2d 506, 507 (10th Cir. 1934). Similar concerns arise in the area of
intramilitary tort immunity. For a discussion of these concerns, see Comment, The
Feres Doctrine: Has it Created Remediless Wrongs For Relatives of Servicemen?, 44
U. PiTT. L. REV. 929, 952-53 (1983) (restricting the words "incident to service" to re-
quire an ad hoc determination of whether the policies behind the Feres doctrine are
advanced by invoking the defense of sovereign immunity).
69. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-620 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
70. Id. §§ 901-908.
71. Id. §§ 1801-1827.
72. Id. §§ 801-806, 1901-1904.
73. Id. §§ 1501-1511.
74. Id. §§ 1601-1643, 1650-1698, 1700-1766.
75. Id. §§ 2001-2008, 2011-2014.
76. See 93 C.J.S. War & National Defense § 26 (1956 & Supp. 1989); see also Sile-
sian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469, 475-77 (1947).
77. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 1-44 (West 1968 & Supp. 1989).
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tional duty to compensate the enemy owner. 78 The TWEA
authorizes the seizure of enemy-owned property to be held in custody
by an Alien Property Custodian or the Attorney General.79 The pri-
mary purpose of this statute is to protect American creditors by
transferring possession of such property to the Custodian for admin-
istration.8 0 Although the Custodian is under no constitutional obliga-
tion to return the property following the war, the TWEA
nevertheless has been interpreted to suggest such a return after all
claims against the property have been settled.81
The Custodian is explicitly authorized to return property owned by
United States citizens or alien friends which was confiscated during
the war.8 2 Section 9 of the TWEA reserves the right of any claimant
who is neither an enemy nor an ally of the enemy to file a suit in
equity to recover the claimant's property.83 Whether the claimant
will succeed, therefore, largely depends upon the individual's rela-
tionship to the United States during the war.84 However, the claim-
ant will not have a cause of action against the Alien Property
78. See Silesian.American Corp., 332 U.S. at 475-77; Cummings v. Deutsche Bank
und Disconto-Gesellschaft, 300 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1937); Woodson v. Deutsche Gold und
Silber Scheideanstalt Vormals Roessler, 292 U.S. 449, 453-54 (1934); United States v.
Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 11 (1926) (Congress may constitutionally author-
ize the confiscation of enemy property within the United States without compensating
the owners).
79. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 6 (West 1968 & Supp. 1989). The President of the United
States may appoint an Alien Property Custodian. This individual is "empowered to re-
ceive all money and property in the United States due or belonging to an enemy, or
ally of [sic] enemy, which may be paid, conveyed, transferred, assigned or delivered to
said custodian under the provisions of this Act." IdA; see also 93 C.J.S. War & National
Defense § 26(3) (1956 & Supp. 1989).
80. See Zittman v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 471, 473-74 (1951) (Custodian took possession
of funds in alien enemy's American bank account to oversee distribution to enemy's
creditor, who had obtained a judgment and attachment against the property).
81. See Cummings, 300 U.S. at 122-24 (Court determined that Congress had the
discretion to return German property held within the United States following World
War I to the former alien enemy owners).
82. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 9 (West 1968 & Supp. 1989); Jackson v. Irving Trust Co.,
311 U.S. 494, 500-01 (1940).
83. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 9(a) (West 1968 & Supp. 1989). The claimant is required
under the statute to file a notice of the claim with the Alien Property Custodian.
Thereafter, the President may order that the money or property held by the Custodian
be returned to the claimant. Id; see also id. § 32.
84. Section 2 of the TWEA defines the term "enemy" as any individual, group of
individuals, partnership, or corporation, residing, doing business, domiciled, or incorpo-
rated in the territory of any nation with which the United States is at war. Id. § 2(a).
This includes the government of any "nation with which the United States is at war,"
or any other individual or entity which the President so designates as an enemy of the
United States. I& § 2(b).
Custodian for erroneously seizing property believed to be owned by
an enemy.8 5
While Congress may requisition property of United States citizens
or non-enemy aliens during wartime,8 6 the statutes permitting such
action also generally require that compensation be paid to the
owner.8 7 The general rule is that compensation will be paid by the
government even in cases of great need or imminent danger to the
public.88 The measure of recovery is normally restitution,8 9 plus the
income from that property while it was in the Alien Property Custo-
dian's possession, including dividends and interest earnings. 90 How-
ever, the victim may not recover interest on the property merely
because it was in the Custodian's possession for a period of time.91
C. The War Claims Act and Prisoners of War
The War Claims Act (WCA) was enacted primarily to handle
claims from prisoners of war following World War 11.92 It established
a War Claims Commission to receive and investigate the claims,
93
and a War Claims Fund consisting of assets covered under the TWEA
to pay for the claims.94
International law recognizes the right of belligerent nations to cap-
ture and detain opposing military personnel. 95 Congress has defined
a "prisoner of war" as a member of the United States Armed Serv-
ices held captive by any nation with whom the United States has
been at war subsequent to December 7, 1941.96 If an individual quali-
fies for prisoner of war status, that person is entitled to have the War
85. Section 7(c) of the TWEA authorizes the Alien Property Custodian to seize
property which, in his or her discretion, is enemy-owned; no judicial determination is
necessary prior to sequestration, and such a seizure is lawful even though the Custo-
dian's determination was incorrect. Id. § 7(c).
86. See International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 406-08 (1931); 78 AM.
JUR. 2D War § 23 (1975).
87. See International Paper Co., 282 U.S. at 408; Marian & Rye Valley Ry. Co. v.
United States, 270 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1926). This requirement also finds support in the
no-taking clause of the Fifth Amendment, which generally prohibits the taking of pri-
vate property for public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
88. But see Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 361 F.2d 106, 113 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966) (exception to awarding compensation to non-enemy
aliens when the United States seeks to protect its nationals in a foreign country by
seizing the assets of that country's nationals held in the United States).
89. See 78 AM. JUR. 2D War § 25 (1975).
90. Id. § 64.
91. Id. § 25.
92. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2001-2017 (West 1951 & Supp. 1989).
93. Id. §§ 2001-2002.
94. Id. § 2012.
95. U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Anns. I, art. 44 (1977), reprinted in 16 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L
L., INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1391, 1410-11 (1977) [hereinafter ILM]; see also 93 C.J.S.
War & National Defense § 24(c)(2) (1956 & Supp. 1989).
96. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2005(a) (West 1951).
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Claims Commission adjudicate claims regarding the quantity or qual-
ity of food provided, or inhumane treatment, by the enemy govern-
ment.97 If the Commission finds that the American prisoner was not
provided the appropriate quantity or quality of food while in captiv-
ity, the prisoner will be compensated at the rate of $1 to $2 per day
by the United States government depending on the war during which
the individual was imprisoned.98 For each day the prisoner suffered
inhumane treatment by the enemy government, $1.50 to $3 also will
be paid.99 In addition, the individual's military status regarding pay
and allowances is not affected by the captivity.100 Therefore, that
person will continue to receive the same salary and benefits as was
received prior to capture.101
D. The Missing Persons Act and Prisoners of War
The Missing Persons Act 102 (MPA) also provides for the continua-
tion of salary and allowances to missing persons and prisoners of
war.103 The MPA creates a savings fund to which an individual may
apportion his salary and allowances plus accrued interest while clas-
sified as a missing person.'0 4 A Secretary is appointed to oversee the
management and distribution of funds to the missing person's depen-
dents for as long as that individual remains missing.' 0 5 The Secre-
tary is accorded "extensive and flexible" discretion in discharging the
97. See generally id. § 2005 (West 1951 & Supp. 1989).
98. Id. § 2005(b), (e)(2), (f)(2). Thus far only prisoners of the Vietnam War have
received $2 per day.
99. Id. § 2005(d)(3), (e)(3), (f)(3). Thus far, only prisoners of the Vietnam War
who were inhumanely treated have received $2 per day.
100. See 6 C.J.S. Armed Services § 111 (1956 & Supp. 1989). However, the -prisoner
of war will not maintain pre-captivity military status if he or she was contributorily
negligent in failing to follow orders or carry out assigned duties. Id.
101. Id.; see also Cherry v. United States, 640 F.2d 1184 (Ct. CI. 1980), off'd, 697
F.2d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
102. 37 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-559 (West 1988).
103. Id. § 552. The MPA provides other indirect methods for compensating prison-
ers of war. It authorizes payment for transportation of "household and personal ef-
fects" of an American soldier "officially reported as dead, injured, ill, or absent for a
period of more than 29 days in a missing status." Id. § 554. It also permits an income
tax deferment for missing personnel. Id. § 558.
104. Id. § 559(b).
105. Id. § 556; see also id. § 553(e). Section 553(e) provides that the Secretary may,
"in the interest of the member, his dependents, or the United States, direct the initia-
tion, continuance, discontinuance, increase, decrease, suspension, or resumption of pay-
ments of allotments from the pay and allowances of a member entitled to pay and
allowances under section 552 of this title." Id.
duties of that office. 106
This wide discretion, however, has created some problems in the
handling of those funds. In Cherry v. United States,o 7 Cherry was
flying a combat mission over North Vietnam when his plane was shot
down. He remained a prisoner of war for eight years. Although the
Air Force believed he was still alive, they were unable to communi-
cate with him. During that period, the Secretary of the Air Force
disbursed to Cherry's wife and four children nearly all of the approx-
imately $147,000 accrued in his account. When Cherry returned, he
learned that his wife had given birth to another man's child while
she was receiving support from Cherry's military pay.
The Cherry court held that, while the Air Force should have at
some point investigated Mrs. Cherry's claims and perhaps discontin-
ued the disbursements, the Secretary still must be given wide discre-
tion in such cases. 108 The court reasoned that wide discretion allows
the Secretary to provide for the prisoner's dependents under chang-
ing circumstances while the prisoner is away. 109 As is apparent from
this case, however, such wide discretion may be exercised contrary to
the prisoner's wishes.
Another shortcoming of the MPA is its restrictions on who has
standing to sue on behalf of the war victim. Under the statute, only
the missing person's dependents are entitled to sue.1l 0 This narrow
class often precludes claims of emotional distress by those closest to
the victim, or claims which the victim may have wanted filed in his
absence.
106. See, e.g., Cherry v. United States, 640 F.2d 1184, 1186 (Ct. Cl. 1980), aff'd, 697
F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (Fed. Cir. 1983); cf Luna v. United States, 810 F.2d 1105 (Fed Cir.
1987) (Secretary of Defense did not abuse his discretion in permitting four emergency
withdrawals from the Uniformed Service Savings Deposit Program account by the
plaintiff's wife); Pitchford v. United States, 666 F.2d 533 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (Air Force did
not abuse its discretion in disbursing payments to the faithful spouse of a Vietnam
prisoner of war).
107. 697 F.2d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
108. Id. at 1048. The court held that the Secretary nevertheless abused his discre-
tion at that point when an investigation should have begun into Mrs. Cherry's needless
and excessive expenditures and her serious misconduct. Id at 1049-50.
109. Id at 1048-49. The dissent in the Cherry court of claims case argued that "[the
Secretary] did abuse his discretion in a most deplorable way, to plaintiff's great disad-
vantage. The character of his abuse was gross negligence... in failing to evaluate the
demands of plaintiff's wife for access to his accumulating pay and allowances while he
was a prisoner of war." Cherry, 640 F.2d at 1191. Characterizing the Secretary's abuse
of discretion as gross negligence meant that he was immune from tort liability under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id.
110. 37 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 1988). Section 551 states in pertinent part: "(1) The
term 'dependent'... means-(a) his spouse; (b) his unmarried child (including an un-
married dependent stepchild or adopted child) under 21 years of age; (c) his dependent
mother or father; (d) a dependent designated in official records; and (e) a person deter-
mined to be dependent by the Secretary concerned, or his designee." Id
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In Fors v. Lehman,"' Fors' plane was shot down over Laos in 1967.
He and another individual were spotted ejecting from the plane.
Fors was placed on "missing in action" status and his pay, allowances
and subsequent promotion were placed in an interest bearing account
pursuant to the Uniformed Services Savings Deposit Program."i 2 In
1979, the Marines changed Fors' status to "killed in action". His non-
dependent parents filed suit as his limited guardians. They claimed
that the change in status denied their son due process by making the
recovery of his estate more difficult should he return after its distri-
bution. They also claimed mental anguish on their own behalf stem-
ming from their son's reclassification as killed in action.
The Fors court denied both claims." 3 It first held that procedural
due process was satisfied in this case 114 under the requirements set
forth in McDonald v. McLucas.n 5 The court then stated that Fors,
not his parents, was the real party in interest, and that he could file
his own claim should he return.11 6 The court also noted that the par-
ents' mental anguish claim should fail because it was not an interest
protected by either the MPA or the due process clause."i 7 The Fors
court in effect precluded both Fors and his parents from redress.
While Fors may sue to recover his property upon his return, this may
be impractical once his estate has been distributed.118 The court pre-
vented Fors' parents from protecting their son's interests simply be-
cause they were not his dependents under the statute."19 However,
111. 741 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1984).
112. See 10 U.S.C. § 1035 (West 1988).
113. Fors, 741 F.2d at 1134.
114. Id. at 1133.
115. 371 F. Supp. 831, 836 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 987 (1974). The McDonald
court held that "due process required that next-of-kin of servicemen missing in action
be given notice of the status review, a reasonable opportunity to attend the review
with a lawyer, access to the information upon which the reviewing board would act,
and the opportunity to present information which they considered relevant." Fors, 741
F.2d at 1133 (construing McDonald, 371 F. Supp. at 836).
116. Fors, 741 F.2d at 1133-34; see also Hopper v. Carter, 572 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1978)
(relatives of servicemen captured or missing in action were denied injunctive relief
against a determination of death under the Act); Crone v. United States, 538 F.2d 875
(3d Cir. 1976) (relatives of missing servicemen whose status changed from "missing in
action" to "killed in action" were denied standing).
117. Fors, 741 F.2d at 1134. The Fors court never decided this issue because the par-
ents failed to assert any monetary injury.
118. The Fors court sidestepped this concern by noting that the United States gov-
ernment makes a concerted effort to determine what actually happened to the individ-
ual before distributing his estate. Id. However, this does not address the real problem
which occurs when the government is wrong and the individual returns to find his pos-
sessions distributed to several different and potentially distant locations.
119. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
Fors had no statutory dependents to protect his interest during his
absence. His parents' emotional anguish claim failed for the same
reason.120 This inequitable result is exacerbated whenever the miss-
ing person and non-dependent claimants have a close relationship.
The latter may not recover if they do not fall within the narrow defi-
nition of a dependent under the MPA.
IV. LEGAL ACTIONS IN UNITED STATES COURTS
The majority of recent litigation in this country concerning war
victims may be divided into three categories: (1) actions to recover
for internment during World War II, (2) suits on the proceeds of war
risk insurance policies, and (3) claims under the TWEA for property
held or destroyed. The cases described below are the most important
in these areas and illustrate the typical problems war victims will
continue to face in seeking redress.
A. Internees-Japanese-Americans During World War II
Congress may, within its war powers, authorize the internment of
citizens whom it believes pose a threat to national security or public
safety.121 Internment is subject to review by the courts 22 given the
restraints on certain constitutionally guaranteed individual
liberties.123
The most important cases regarding Congressional power to intern
United States citizens occurred during World War II. During this
time, citizens of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from designated
military areas and detained at relocation centers situated throughout
the country.124 In Korematsu v. United States,125 an American citi-
120. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945). Congress is further per-
mitted under its war powers to impose curfews to guard against sabotage and espio-
nage, which may more easily occur during the night, and to exclude or evacuate
citizens from certain military areas for similar reasons without violating constitutional
guarantees. See 78 AM. JUR. 2D War,§§ 39, 40 (1975). Such infringements on individ-
ual liberties are comparable to "the police establishment of fire lines during a fire, or
the confinement of people to their houses during an air raid alarm-neither of which
could be thought to be an infringement of constitutional right." Id. § 39.
122. See Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. at 304-07.
123. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
124. Residents of the Aleutian and Pribilof islands also were relocated to camps in
isolated regions of Southeast Alaska following a Japanese attack on those islands in
1942. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1988, § A, at 10, col. 1. Although the United States govern-
ment took such action to protect the Aleuts, Aleutian property was either damaged or
destroyed by the United States without compensation. L.A. Times, Aug. 11, 1988, § 1,
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zen of Japanese descent was convicted of violating an Act of Con-
gress126 prohibiting such persons from entering the West Coast area
after May 9, 1942. Korematsu argued that the 1942 Act unconstitu-
tionally discriminated against citizens of Japanese ancestry, and that
it also impermissibly extended the war powers of Congress, the Pres-
ident, and the military.127
The United States Supreme Court held otherwise. It concluded
that the Act was constitutional, and that the war powers were prop-
erly invoked to exclude Korematsu from the West Coast.128 The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, reasoned that the exclusion
and internment was necessary to protect the country from sabotage
and espionage in an area particularly vulnerable to Japanese at-
tack. 29 The Court further noted that while many, Japanese Ameri-
cans were loyal to the United States, an indeterminate number were
disloyal.130 Time was short, and the Court concluded that immediate
action was required, even though this meant causing hardship to
many.' 3 '
Several other Japanese-Americans filed suit during World War II
arguing that they were, in effect, war victims at the hands of the
United States government. In Hirabayashi v. United States,3 2 the
Court held that a curfew imposed on Japanese-Americans requiring
at 1, col. 1. In 1988, Congress provided for the payment of $12,000 to approximately
450 Aleuts who were forced to relocate during this period. See 50 U.S.CA. appi!
§ 1989(c) (West Supp. 1989).
125. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945).
126. Act of Mar. 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173. The Act provides:
That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military
area or military zone prescribed ... contrary to the restrictions applicable to
any such area or zone . . . shall, if it appears that he knew or should have
known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act
was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall
be liable to a fine of not to exceed $5,000 or to imprisonment for not more
than one year, or both, for each offense.
Id. A similar version of this act appears in Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 765,
which formerly appeared as 18 U.S.C.A. § 1383, repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1258. Those of Japanese ancestry were required to "(1) depart
from the area; (2) report to and temporarily remain in an assembly center; (3) go
under military control to a relocation center there to remain for an indeterminate pe-
riod until released conditionally or unconditionally by the military authorities." Kore-
matsu, 323 U.S. at 222.
127. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18.
128. Id. at 219.
129. Id. at 218.
130. Id. at 218-19.
131. Id. at 219-20.
132. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
them to remain in their homes from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. was constitu-
tional and necessary to protect the West Coast from a Japanese at-
tack. 3 3 In Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo,34 however, the Court held that
once it has been determined that a citizen of Japanese ancestry is
loyal to the United States, that citizen can no longer be detained or
conditionally released. 135 As recently as 1987, constitutional, tort,
and breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims were filed by in-
terned Japanese-Americans against the United States.136
Ironically, while these cases reflect current federal law regarding
internment, Congress has allocated $1.2 billion in compensation to an
estimated 60,000 internees of World War II.137 In 1988, Congress
passed a law entitling internees to $20,000 in compensation. 38 The
first payments will be made in October 1990.139 The fact that com-
pensation will be paid implies that Congress is softening its stance on
the internment issue and is becoming increasingly sensitive to pre-
serving the fundamental rights of its citizens during wartime.14
0
133. Id. at 95. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Stone, noted that approxi-
mately 112,000 of the 126,000 Japanese-Americans in the United States resided in Cali-
fornia, Oregon, and Washington, and that many of these individuals declined to
assimilate with the white population. Id. at 96, 98. The Court feared that these cir-
cumstances could give rise to a propaganda campaign which would threaten the stabil-
ity of the United States government. Id. at 98; see also Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S.
115 (1943) (Japanese-American who was born and raised in Oregon, received A.B. and
LL.B. degrees from the University of Oregon, became a member of the Oregon bar and
a second lieutenant in the United States Army Infantry Reserve, was also constitution-
ally held subject to the curfew).
134. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
135. Id. at 302.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987), on remand, 847 F.2d 779
(Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 307 (1988).
137. L.A. Times, Aug. 5, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 5. While several national defense rea-
sons were cited by the United States Supreme Court to justify the internment of Japa-
nese-Americans during World War II, those reasons were baseless. The Commission of
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians established in 1980 determined that
the real reasons for the internment were "racial prejudice, wartime hysteria and a fail-
ure of political leadership." Id.
138. Id., Sept. 30, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 4. This money now will be allocated over three
years to the former internees. Id.
139. Id. Only those Japanese-Americans who were interned during World War II
and who were still alive when the bill was signed into law will receive payments. Id.,
Aug. 5, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 5. Family members of a deceased internee are not entitled to
compensation under the law. Id. Moreover, if an internee dies after the legislation is
enacted, only the surviving spouse, children, or parents may continue to receive pay-
ments on behalf of the decedent. Id. Payments will go to the oldest victims first. Id.
140. Representative Norman Y. Mineta (D-San Jose) was removed from his San
Jose home as a 10-year-old and interned with his parents at the Santa Anita race track.
He later was moved to another camp in Wyoming, where he remained for a year-and-
a-half. In reflecting on his internment, Mineta noted that "[p]eople said this was being
done to protect us.... If that was so, why were the machine guns pointing at us?" Id.,
Aug. 5, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 5. He added, "Does our Constitution protect all of us-re-
gardless of race or culture? Do our rights remain inalienable even in times of stress-
and especially in times of stress? Passage of this legislation answers these questions-
a resounding 'yes.'" Id.
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Therefore, current internment case law appears antiquated.
Although $1.2 billion has now been allocated to these victims of
war, the legislative struggle to guarantee this money was hard fought
indeed. First, the law initially required that Congress vote each year
on whether to continue payments.141 If members of Congress chose
to discontinue them, internees or their immediate families had no
statutory recourse.142 Second, internee compensation would have
had to compete with all the other items in the federal budget.143 Fu-
ture Congressional appropriations would have been unlikely, particu-
larly since the budget deficit has become an increasingly
embarrassing issue for many federal legislators.144 Representative
Robert T. Matsui (D-Sacramento), who was himself interned during
World War II and was a primary supporter of the compensation bill,
admitted in an interview, "Do you vote to provide funds for this pro-
gram at the expense of something like AIDS research?"145 Repre-
sentative Gerald Solomon (R-N.Y.) added, "There are many dire
emergencies we're dealing with in this country, but this program is
not one of them. All of this happened 40 years ago, and I just don't
see the hurry."146
Another obstacle to compensating these war victims was the oppo-
sition in Congress. Some federal lawmakers felt that, while the in-
ternment may have been an error, an apology in the form of
substantial monetary compensation was unwarranted.147 Although
these obstacles were eliminated when the legislation guaranteeing
the reparations was signed into law by President Bush on November
21, 1989, one obstacle still remains. Some of these war victims may
never be compensated simply because they are dying off. Given that
the internment occurred over forty years ago, it is no surprise that
approximately 16,000 internees are over 70, and over 200 die each
month.148 While future federal appropriations are now guaranteed,
141. Id., May 7, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. President Bush was reluctant to commit to any substantial allocation under
the reparations law. The Justice Department requested that President Bush seek $500
million from Congress for 1990 to pay 25,000 internees. Bush, however, only requested
$20 million. This would have paid only 1,000 of the approximately 60,000 persons eligi-
ble for such payments. Id., May 7, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
145. Id.
146. Id
147. Id., Aug. 5, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
148. Id., May 7, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
many of these internees likely will not live long enough to receive
their share.
B. Insurance Policies
Courts generally have construed statutory and private war risk in-
surance policies broadly to protect the insured.149 The underlying
public policy is to promote financial security for those who serve
their country.15 0 A difficult burden, however, is placed upon the in-
sured under many war risk policies to prove the extent of their inju-
ries. Failure to do so may result in a complete denial of recovery
under the policy. Initially, a plaintiff was required to prove that he
was totally and permanently disabled and unable to maintain any
employment. The United States Supreme Court soon softened its in-
terpretation of "total and permanent disability" due to the harsh
consequences.
In Berry v. United States,151 Berry's war risk insurance policy re-
quired that he be totally and permanently disabled before payments
could be made. While Berry was standing guard on the front line in
France, a shell burst nearby, injuring him in several places. He was
carried to a dugout for treatment, where another shell exploded kill-
ing several of the men in the dugout and nearly severing Berry's left
leg. His leg eventually was amputated six inches below the knee.
For the next thirteen years, Berry tried several jobs, but boils and ab-
scesses would break out on the leg whenever he used it for any
length of time.
The court of appeals denied Berry recovery on the grounds that he
failed to show that his injuries prevented him from obtaining "any
substantially gainful occupation."1 52 The court of appeals, in essence,
required him to be "utterly without earning power" and "so bedrid-
den and helpless that he required an attendant."153 Because Berry
149. See 6 C.J.S. Armed Services § 194 (1975).
150. See United States v. Patryas, 303 U.S. 341, 343 (1938). In holding that the War
Risk Insurance Act should be construed liberally to protect military personnel and
their dependents, the Patryas Court noted that the express purpose of the Act itself is
"to give every commissioned officer and enlisted man and to every member of the
Army Nurse Corps (female) and of the Navy Nurse Corps (female) when employed in
active service under the War Department or Navy Department greater protection for
themselves and their dependents." Id. (emphasis in original); see also United States v.
Henning, 344 U.S. 66, 71, rehg denied, 344 U.S. 918 (1952). The Henning court stated
that "Congress through war risk insurance legislation has long sought to protect from
financial hardship the surviving families of those who had served under the nation's
flag." Id.
151. 111 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 450 (1941).
152. Berry, 312 U.S. at 455-56 n.7; see also Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, reh'g
denied, 294 U.S. 734 (1935); Lumbra v. United States, 290 U.S. 551 (1934).
153. Berry, 111 F.2d at 617.
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retained some mobility and could still use his hands, he was denied
recovery.
Although the United States Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals' decision in Berry, the injured war victim still has the burden
of proving the extent of his injuries.1 5 4 The United States Supreme
Court has interpreted "total and permanent disability" to mean "con-
tinuous disability". 155 A failure to prove continuous disability will re-
sult in a denial of recovery under the war risk policy.
Similarly, in Meyer v. United States,156 a veteran who acquired tu-
berculosis after his service and lacked the stamina to perform any
heavy work was denied recovery because he was not deemed totally
and permanently disabled.157 The claimant in Le Blanc v. United
States 158 also suffered from tuberculosis acquired during his military
service. He was unable to return to work as a freight handler follow-
ing the war. Subsequent vocational training and job transfers proved
useless because Le Blanc was often absent due to his deteriorating
condition. The Le Blanc court nevertheless denied him recovery be-
cause he was not totally and permanently disabled.159 Furthermore,
the court in Hicks v. United States 160 held that although the question
of whether the insured became totally and permanently disabled is
one of fact for the jury to decide,161 this did not mean that Hicks was
entitled to recovery following a jury verdict.'6 2 Evidence of the
plaintiff's condition, or of continuous work done by him demonstrat-
ing that he was not totally and permanently disabled, may still result
in a directed verdict for the government.163
154. See Miller, 294 U.S. at 440.
155. Lumbra, 290 U.S. at 559-60. "'Total disability' does not mean helplessness or
complete disability, but it includes more than that which is partial. 'Permanent disa-
bility' means that which is continuing as opposed to what is temporary. Separate and
distinct periods of temporary disability do not constitute that which is permanent."
Id.; cf Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, reh'g denied, 320 U.S. 214 (1943) ("total
permanent disability" requires something more than a showing of occasional disabilty).
156. 65 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1933); see also Keelen v. United States, 65 F.2d 513 (5th
Cir. 1933) (claimant denied recovery under the insurance policy because he was not ad-
judged totally and permanently disabled).
157. Meyer, 65 F.2d at 511.
158. 65 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1933).
159. Id. at 516.
160. 65 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1933).
161. Id. at 519.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see also Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, reh'g denied, 294 U.S. 734
(1935) (inability to return to a former occupation after being injured during military
service does not by itself constitute "total and permanent disability" under a war risk
policy); Lumbra v. United States, 290 U.S. 551 (1934) (inexplicable delay in filing suit
Thus, while Congress and private companies liberally provide war
risk insurance policies to those in the service, compensation often is
withheld for failure to prove total and permanent disability. For
many of these war victims, this means they are too injured to earn a
sufficient living, but not injured enough to recover their insurance
proceeds. Coupled with the high cost of private medical care, the re-
sulting consequences are often inequitable.
C. Recovery of Property-Iranian Assets Held During the Hostage
Crisis
On November 14, 1979, United States diplomats and other nationals
were taken hostage in the American embassy in Teheran, Iran. Pres-
ident Carter declared a national emergency and barred the transfer
or withdrawal of all property of the Iranian government within the
United States. Several suits subsequently were filed to recover or at-
tach the Iranian assets held in this country. Although no conven-
tional warfare began, these cases illustrate the President's broad
powers under the TWEA concerning claims by United States nation-
als during a national emergency. 16 4
In Security Pac. Nat' Bank v. Gov't & State of Iran,165 several cor-
porations conducted business in Iran during the rule of the late Shah.
After the Shah was overthrown, the subsequent government refused
to perform certain duties owed to the corporations. The corporations
then filed suit to attach a portion of Iranian assets frozen in United
States banks. The United States, however, intervened to suspend the
proceedings and vacate the attachments. The principle issue in the
case was whether the President was constitutionally permitted to
void the writs of attachment under the TWEA in order to reach a
settlement between the governments and to resolve hostilities.
The court held that President Carter's actions did not deprive the
plaintiffs of property without due process of law under the fifth
amendment.166 However, the President could not void the attach-
on war risk policy is strong evidence that the plaintiff was not "totally and perma-
nently disabled" prior to the policy's expiration).
164. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act limits the executive pow-
ers previously granted by the TWEA in national emergencies, excluding war. See gen-
erally 50 U.S.C.A §§ 1701-1706 (1982). However, these limitations on the President's
power to take title to foreign property, to seize records, and to regulate gold, bullion,
or domestic transactions, are still available under the TWEA during wartime. See H.R.
REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1977).
165. 513 F. Supp. 864 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
166. Id. at 882. The court noted that settlement of the political dispute between the
two countries did not necessarily mean that the plaintiffs would never recover. On the
contrary, a $1 billion fund established by the President over which Iran would have no
control, likely would satisfy the majority of claims against Iran. Id. Moreover, Con-
gress has the authority to provide future compensation to American plaintiffs through
special legislation. Id
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ments without a court order, which never was obtained.167 The court
reasoned that the power to conduct United States foreign relations is
vested in the President, who has the authority to represent American
nationals in their claims against foreign governments. 168 The frozen
Iranian assets, therefore, were subject to the President's foreign pol-
icy objectives, and could not be tampered with by the corporations
seeking recovery.
In Dames & Moore v. Regan,169 the United States Supreme Court
was faced with the problem of how to handle the claims to those as-
sets once the American hostages were released. In that case, the
plaintiff filed suit against the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
(AEOI) claiming'that it owed money for services performed under a
contract.170 The district court ordered a prejudgment attachment
against the AEOI's property to secure any judgment possibly entered
against it.171 In January 1981, the hostages were released pursuant to
an agreement requiring the United States to void all judgments and
attachments and to terminate all lawsuits against Iran, and to resolve
such claims through international arbitration.172 Iranian assets then
were transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 17 3 Fol-
lowing this agreement, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.174
In broadly construing the TWEA, the Regan Court permitted the
President to continue maintaining the Iranian assets at his dispo-
sal.175 The Court viewed the frozen assets as a "bargaining chip" for
the President to use in resolving a major foreign policy dispute.176
Congressional acquiescence, plus the President's authority to enter
into executive agreements without the Senate's consent, supported
this conclusion.177  Once again, American claimants were
167. Id. at 881-82.
168. Id. at 871-72.
169. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
170. Id. at 663-64.
171. Id.
172. H at 665; see also Gibraltar Petroleum Corp. v. Bank Sepah, 526 F. Supp. 560
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (United States nationals could file claims against Iran solely with the
Tribunal created by the Algerian Declaration, not United States courts).
173. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 665-66.
174. Id. at 690.
175. Id, at 672-73.
176. Id at 673.
177. Id. at 681-83. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that:
[T]here has... been a longstanding practice of settling such claims [of Ameri-
can nationals] by executive agreement without the advice and consent of the
Senate. Under such agreements, the President has agreed to renounce or ex-
subordinated to the President's broad authority under the TWEA.
Similar actions under the TWEA have produced the same result.
For example, in Tran Qui Than v. Reoan,178 the Secretary of the
Treasury of the United States denied a Vietnamese claimant's access
to funds after South Vietnam fell to the communist forces.179 The
court held that the Secretary's action was constitutional and within
the scope of the TWEA.180 The court in Unidyne Corp. v. Govern-
ment of Iranl8 1 also held that the President's authority to enter into
an international agreement, such as with Iran, which provides for the
transfer of foreign assets out of the United States, even though pre-
judgment attachments previously were issued in favor of American
plaintiffs, was permissible under the TWEA.182 Thus, while claims
by American nationals to foreign property held within the United
States may indeed be valid, they nevertheless are subject to the for-
eign policy objectives of the executive branch.
V. INTERNATIONAL METHODS OF COMPENSATING AND PROTECTING
VICTIMS OF WAR
A. International Methods of Compensation
International law continues to be a dynamic body of rules gov-
erning the conduct of nations. While many view its growth as a nec-
essary precursor to world order, the field has yet to develop a
uniform and binding approach to compensating victims of war. As
one writer bluntly describes the situation, "Remedies in international
law are in a striking state of neglect."s3
1. The United Nations
The United Nations and its principal judicial organ, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ), are perhaps the most important source
tinguish claims of United States nationals against foreign governments in re-
turn for lump-sum payments or the establishment of arbitration procedures.
To be sure, many of these settlements were encouraged by the United States
claimants themselves, since a claimant's only hope of obtaining any payment
at all might lie in having his Government negotiate a diplomatic settlement on
his behalf.
Id. at 679 (footnote omitted).
178. 658 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
179. Id. at 1300.
180. Id. at 1304-06.
181. 512 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Va. 1981).
182. Id. at 708-10; see also International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1706 (defining the scope of the President's power to handle property
located in the United States in which a foreign government, or a national thereof, has
an interest).
183. E. ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH U.S. LEGISLATION 1
(1985).
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of international law today.1S4 The ICJ consists of a fifteen-member
court whose function is to decide disputes submitted to it by the
United Nations General Assembly or any state.'8 5 In reaching its de-
cisions, the ICJ looks to rules established by international organiza-
tions or conventions, international custom, laws observed by civilized
nations, and judicial commentary by those highly regarded in the
field of international law.' 8 6
The United Nations' Charter specifies the ICJ's role in resolving
international claims. Article 94 of the Charter provides:
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the deci-
sion of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it
under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse
to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommenda-
tions or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. 18 7
The biggest problem the ICJ has faced since its inception is enforc-
ing its judgments. As yet, no one has appealed to the United Nations
Security Council to devise a means of enforcing an order by the
ICJ.88 It still is unknown whether the Security Council may use
force to compel a state to follow an ICJ order.'8 9
Nevertheless, the ICJ has been instrumental in resolving interna-
tional political conflicts, and directing reparations to the victims of
those conflicts.190 In 1981, the ICJ entered a judgment concerning
184. For opinions issued by the ICJ, see generally 1-2 DIGEST OF THE DECISIONS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (K. Marek ed. 1978); SECTION OF INT'L LAW, AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE OPINION BRIEFS (1978). For a good dis-
cussion regarding the processes of establishing international law at the United Nations,
see generally E. MCWHINNEY, UNITED NATIONS LAW MAKING (1984).
185. See generally 1 A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 137-47,
180-94 (Min-Chuan Ku ed. 1978); DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUS-
TICE 59-89 (S. Rosenne 2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT].
186. STATUTE OF THE INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, para. 1, reprinted in DOCU-
MENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT supra note 185, at 79.
187. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT, supra note 185, at 49.
188. SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 74 (3d ed.
1988).
189. IK
190. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. In August, 1989, the United States
government agreed to participate in ICJ proceedings with Iran at the Hague regarding
alleged violations of international law. Nat'l L.J., Sept. 4, 1989, at 3, col. 1. Iran
claimed that the United States violated the Chicago and Montreal conventions by
shooting down an Iranian airliner over the Persian Gulf in July, 1987. Reuter Libr.
Rep., Aug. 15, 1989 (AM cycle). The United States, however, contended that the ICJ
lacks jurisdiction, and may refuse to abide by a decision which favors Iran. Id
the release of the American hostages in Teheran.191 The decision re-
quired Iran to release the hostages and to compensate the United
States in an amount to be determined later by the ICJ.192 Upon the
release of the hostages, however, the United States withdrew its
claims against Iran pending before the ICJ.193
2. Other International Tribunals
There are other lesser known international courts throughout the
world which are empowered to adjudicate claims by war victims.
These include the Court of Justice of the European Community, the
European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe, the In-
ter-American Court of Human Rights of the Organization of Ameri-
can States, and the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement
which serves Latin America.194 In addition, international arbitration
tribunals may be created for the same purpose. These judicial bodies,
however, face problems similar to those of the ICJ.1 9 5 Their judg-
ments are enforceable merely to the extent that the parties to the
agreement are willing to be bound by them. "It is a striking fact that
States have seldom refused to carry out or abide by the decisions of
international tribunals."196 Moreover, disagreements over the judg-
ment often can delay its implementation for several years.197
B. International Methods of Protection
In addition to establishing procedures for adjudicating war claims,
the United Nations has promulgated standards governing the conduct
of hostilities. The Geneva Protocols of 1977 specifically define the ac-
tions belligerent nations may take against persons or property during
a war.198 While these standards may have universal appeal, they
clearly are not universally applied.
In general, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from
the civilian population during a military operation by wearing identi-
191. SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 188, at 72-73.
192. Id at 73-74.
193. 1& at 74.
194. Id. at 69-70.
195. As one writer points out, "The laws of war are, theoretically, at least, enforce-
able by international tribunal, but that means of enforcement is rare, as are the in-
stances (most of them medieval) in which an accused citizen of one state is released to
the custody of courts of another state for trial." P. KARSTEN, LAW, SOLDIERS, AND
COMBAT 25 (1978).
196. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: PAST AND FUTURE 129 (1944).
197. SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 188, at 74.
198. The texts of the two Protocols, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I and 11 (1977),
are reprinted in 197-98 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 3 (1977) and 16 ILM, supra note
95, at 1391, 1442. For a good discussion regarding these documents, see also Aldrich,
supra note 13, at 764.
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fiable clothing or carrying their weapons openly.199 Neither civil-
ianS200 nor their property201 are to be the subject of purposeful or
indiscriminate attack, and places of worship,202 cultural objects, 2 03
and objects necessary to the survival of the civilian population204 are
to be protected.
Finally, prisoners of war and internees are accorded fundamental
guarantees regarding their physical and mental health, and personal
dignity. Murder, torture, mutilation, forced prostitution, and hos-
tage-taking are all prohibited acts.2 05 Moreover, no prisoner may be
executed without a conviction by an impartial court applying gener-
ally recognized principles of law.206
VI. CONCLUSION
Combatants, property owners, civilians, prisoners, and internees
may all become victims of war. Although they are entitled to com-
pensation under the various methods discussed above, these methods
are not always effective. Statutory remedies normally are broadly
199. U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Anns. I, art. 44, para. 3 (1977), reprinted in 16 ILM, supra
note 95, at 1391, 1410-11.
200. U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Anns. I, art. 51, para. 3 (1977), reprinted in 16 ILM, supra
note 95, at 1413-14.
201. U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Anns. I, art. 52, para. 3 (1977), reprinted in 16 ILM, supra
note 95, at 1414.
202. U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Anns. I, art. 53, para. 3 (1977), reprinted in 16 ILM, supra
note 95, at 1414.
203. Id.
204. U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Anns. I, art. 54, para. 3 (1977), reprinted in 16 ILM, supra
note 95, at 1414.
205. U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Anns. I, art. 54, para. 3 (1977), reprinted in 16 ILM, supra
note 95, at 1423. This article provides in pertinent part:
2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents:
(a) violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons,
in particular:
(i) murder;
(ii) torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental;
(iii) corporal punishment; and
(iv) mutilation;
(b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
(c) the taking of hostages;
(d) collective punishments; and
(e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
Id.
206. U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Anns. I, art. 75, para. 4 (1977), reprinted in 16 ILM, supra
note 95, at 1424.
construed to protect American soldiers and their dependents, yet
they often provide inadequate compensation or leave the claimant
without a cause of action. While legal recourse may be sought, diffi-
cult burdens of proof and the exercise of Presidential prerogative
may preclude recovery. Finally, international judgments commonly
are difficult to enforce unless the defendant agrees to abide by the
decision. Even with all of these problems, however, compensating
war victims is still necessary. As states persist in resorting to warfare
to settle their disputes, such a framework always will remain.
BRYAN S. HANCE*
The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to his father, Donald E.
Hance, for his encouragement, support, and advice in the preparation of this comment.
